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The evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas in structured populations has been studied exten-
sively in recent years. Whereas many theoretical studies have found that a heterogeneous network
of contacts favors cooperation, the impact of spatial effects in scale-free networks is still not well
understood. In addition to being heterogeneous, real contact networks exhibit a high mean local
clustering coefficient, which implies the existence of an underlying metric space. Here, we show that
evolutionary dynamics in scale-free networks self-organize into spatial patterns in the underlying
metric space. The resulting metric clusters of cooperators are able to survive in social dilemmas
as their spatial organization shields them from surrounding defectors, similar to spatial selection in
Euclidean space. We show that under certain conditions these metric clusters are more efficient than
the most connected nodes at sustaining cooperation and that heterogeneity does not always favor—
but can even hinder—cooperation in social dilemmas. Our findings provide a new perspective to
understand the emergence of cooperation in evolutionary games in realistic structured populations.
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory, structured populations, emergence of cooperation, scale-free networks,
network geometry
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation among humans has been found to be
quite common in social dilemmas [1, 2], and plays a
major role in the emergence of complex modern soci-
eties [3, 4]. Therefore, understanding the underlying
mechanisms that can give rise to and sustain cooperation
from an evolutionary perspective is key to complement-
ing Darwin’s theory of evolution [5–9].
In reality, populations are structured, which means
that the topology of strategic interactions is given by
a network of contacts. In structured populations, in-
dividuals interact repeatedly with the same individuals.
Thus, as a consequence, cooperators can survive in so-
cial dilemmas by forming network clusters. This mech-
anism is referred to as network reciprocity [2, 10]. In
the well-studied case of lattice topologies, the result-
ing network clusters unfold in Euclidean space [11–13]
(spatial selection [14]). Realistic networks of contacts
are heterogeneous rather than lattices and often scale-
free, which means that their degree distribution follows a
power-law with exponent γ ∈ (2, 3), where a lower value
of γ means more heterogeneous networks. Heterogene-
ity has been shown to favor cooperation [15–17], and
cooperating nodes form a connected (or network) clus-
ter [18]. However, the geometric organization of these
connected clusters—similarly to spatial selection in Eu-
clidean space—remains elusive.
Real complex networks, in addition to being hetero-
geneous, exhibit a high mean local clustering coeffi-
cient [19, 20] (this means that the network contains a high
number of closed triangles). This is particularly impor-
tant because a high clustering coefficient implies the ex-
istence of an underlying metric space [21]. We show that
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evolutionary dynamics on scale-free, highly clustered net-
works lead to the formation of patterns in the underly-
ing metric space, similar to the aforementioned spatial
selection in Euclidean space. Using two empirical net-
works, the IPv6 Internet topology and the arXiv collab-
oration network, as well as synthetic networks, we show
that spatial patterns play an important role in the evo-
lution of cooperation. In fact, under certain conditions
metric clusters can even be more effective at sustaining
cooperation than the most connected nodes (hubs). As
a consequence, heterogeneity does not always favor—but
can even hinder—the evolution of cooperation in social
dilemmas.
II. RESULTS
A. Latent geometry of scale-free networks
Real contact networks are usually heterogeneous, and
often scale-free, as well as highly clustered [20] (we refer
to a high mean local clustering coefficient, i.e. a large
number of closed triangles [19]). The effect of scale-free
topologies has attracted a lot of attention, and many the-
oretical studies have found that heterogeneous networks
of contacts favor cooperation in social dilemmas [15–18],
although this behavior has not been confirmed in recent
experiments with human players [22]. Importantly, the
high local clustering coefficients found in real contact net-
works have been proven to imply the existence of a metric
space underlying the observed topology [21]. This means
that the nodes of a given real complex network can be
mapped to coordinates in this metric space such that the
probability that pairs of nodes will be connected in the
observed topology depends only on their distance in the
metric space. Specifically, heterogeneous networks can be
embedded into hyperbolic space [23–25]. In this repre-
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Figure 1. A: Illustration of the hyperbolic spatial structure (Poincare´ Disc) underlying a synthetic network generated by
the model described in Methods. The network shown here has N = 2000 nodes, a power-law exponent γ = 2.6, mean degree
〈k〉 ≈ 6, and mean local clustering coefficient c¯ = 0.6 (temperature T¯ = 0.3 as in Eq. (6), see Methods section for details). Hubs,
i.e. high degree nodes, are placed closer towards the center of the disk (lower radial coordinate). The angular space represents
the similarity between nodes, such that nodes tend to connect to other nodes close to them in this space. The green line shows
the hyperbolic disk of radius R (Eq. (5)) around the green node. We highlight the neighbors of the green node in red. For a
high c¯ (i.e. low T¯ ), as shown here, the green node is highly likely to connect to other nodes within the disc (green line), and a
very unlikely to connect to nodes outside of it (the further apart, the less probable). The high mean local clustering coefficient
is then a consequence of the triangle inequality in the metric space. B: Synthetic network generated with the same model but
with mean local clustering coefficient c¯ = 0.25 (temperature T¯ = 0.7). We again show the hyperbolic disk of radius R (Eq. (5))
around the green node and highlight its neighbors in red. Note that due to the higher temperature more long-range connections
are formed, i.e. the green node connects to more nodes outside of the disc as compared to (A), and does not connect to some
node inside of the disc. This effect reduces the mean local clustering coefficient as it induces randomness in the link formation
process. C: Illustration of evolutionary game dynamics. In structured populations, individuals play with their neighbors in a
network. In each game, they generate a payoff given by the payoff matrix (Eq. (1)). After each round, they choose a random
neighbor and imitate her strategy with a probability (Fermi-Dirac distribution) that depends on the difference between their
payoffs.
sentation, each node has a radial and angular coordinate.
The radial coordinate abstracts the popularity, and hence
the degree of the node, such that hubs are placed closer
to the center of the disk (Fig. 1A). The angular coordi-
nate abstracts a similarity space, such that the angular
distance is a measure of the similarity between two nodes,
whereby nodes tend to connect to more similar nodes. In
Fig. 1A and B we show an illustration of the hyperbolic
metric structure underlying two different networks (see
Methods section for further details). In the following, we
show that evolutionary dynamics trigger the formation
of stable spatial clusters in the angular dimension on the
underlying hyperbolic space.
B. Evolutionary dynamics and the emergence of
metric clusters
Let us first consider the prisoner’s dilemma game, in
particular T = 1.2 and S = −0.2 (see Eq. (1) in Meth-
ods) on synthetic contact networks generated with the
model described in Methods. This model generates re-
alistic topologies based on underlying hyperbolic metric
spaces, similar to Fig. 1A. We simulate the evolutionary
game dynamics (see Methods and Fig. 1C) and find that
the system tends to self-organize into a state in which
groups which are mainly cooperative are clearly separate
from groups populated mainly by defectors (see Fig. 2A-
C and Supplementary Video 1) [26, 27]. Similarly to
the case of lattice topologies and spatial selection in Eu-
clidean space, we observe the formation of clusters of
cooperators in the angular dimension of the underlying
hyperbolic space. In Fig. 2D we show the evolution of
the density of cooperators in different bins of the angu-
lar coordinate θ. We observe that initially cooperation
decreases (see purple line in Fig. 2E) while, at the same
time, the remaining cooperators become concentrated in
clusters in the angular space (Fig. 2A). Cooperation then
increases again as it spreads in the vicinity of the clusters
(Fig. 2B) until the system reaches a stationary state with
fluctuations only at the borders of the clusters (Fig. 2C
and Supplementary Video 1).
We quantify the degree to which cooperators and defec-
tors cluster in the angular space using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) statistic [28], which measures the differ-
ence between two one-dimensional distributions. The
KS-statistic is defined as the maximum absolute differ-
ence between the values of two cumulative distributions.
In particular, we define the KS-statistic of the distribu-
tion of cooperation density in different angular bins, and
the uniform distribution at time t as ρ¯(t) (see Methods
for details). A higher value of ρ¯(t) thus denotes more pro-
nounced clustering of cooperators and defectors respec-
tively. In Fig. 2F we show the evolution of ρ¯(t) for 103
different realizations (blue lines) and their mean (black
line). On average, ρ¯(t) increases initially and approaches
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Figure 2. A-C: Evolution of the system (see also Supplementary Video 1) for a single realization of the prisoner’s dilemma
(T = 1.2 and S = −0.2). Here, we have generated a synthetic network with N = 5000 nodes, power law exponent γ = 2.8,
and mean local clustering c¯ ≈ 0.5. Cooperators are marked in blue, whereas red denotes defectors. The system was started
with randomly selected cooperators (c(0) = 0.5). (A) shows the state of the system after 103, (B) after 104, and (C) after
105 generations. D: Density of cooperators (color coded) in different angular bins (shown on the y axis) as a function of time
(shown on the x axis). Here, we have divided the angular space θ ∈ [0, 2pi) into 20 equidistant bins. E-H: Results for the same
synthetic networks as before but with N = 2 × 104 nodes. E: Evolution of the density of cooperation C for 103 independent
realizations of the system (blue lines) and their average (black line). The purple line corresponds to the realization shown in
(A-C). F: Evolution of the KS-statistics ρ¯ for 103 independent realizations of the system (blue lines) and their average (black
line). The purple line corresponds to the realization shown in (A-C). G: Evolution of the distribution of cooperation C observed
in the system (colors denote time). H: Evolution of the distribution of ρ¯ observed in the system (colors denote time).
a constant value after approximately 102 ∼ 103 gener-
ations. Among different realizations, ρ¯(t) varies signifi-
cantly and we study the evolution of its distribution in
Fig. 2H. We find that at relatively low times, the dis-
tribution shows a peak at ρ¯ ≈ 0.2, which then declines.
Eventually (black line), there is a high proportion of real-
izations with ρ¯ ≈ 0, which must be the case if the system
approaches a state with nearly full cooperation or defec-
tion. It can also be observed from the evolution of the
distribution of cooperation (Fig. 2G) that the probabil-
ity of high cooperation C ≈ 1 increases over time. In
combination, these observations indicate that the evolu-
tionary path towards full cooperation includes a phase
of significant clustering of cooperators. The stationary
distribution of ρ¯ (colored lines converge to the black line
in Fig. 2H) shows that apart from the aforementioned
realizations, the values of ρ¯ are distributed around the
mean of ρ¯ ≈ 0.2.
To conclude, evolutionary dynamics on scale-free net-
works lead to the formation of stable spatial patterns,
which can be observed as metric clusters in the angular
dimension of underlying hyperbolic metric spaces. This
behavior is similar to spatial selection in lattice topolo-
gies, where cooperators form spatial clusters in Euclidean
space.
C. Metric clusters can be more effective than hubs
Let us now consider two empirical networks, the Inter-
net Ipv6 topology, which has N = 5162 nodes, a degree
distribution with power-law exponent γ = 2.1, average
degree k¯ = 5.2, and a mean local clustering coefficient of
c¯ = 0.22 and the arXiv collaboration network, which has
1905 nodes, mean degree 〈k〉 = 4.6, mean local cluster-
ing coefficient c¯ = 0.66, and a power-law degree exponent
γ = 3.9. To address the question of whether spatial clus-
ters or the hubs of a network are more efficient at sustain-
ing cooperation, we use the initial conditions as a proxy
for possible control mechanisms [26, 29–31]. Specifically,
we distribute the initial cooperators (always c(0) = 0.5)
in the system as follows: (i) we randomly assign 50% of
the nodes as cooperators; (ii) we assign the same number
of cooperators preferentially to the hubs of the system,
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Figure 3. Final density of cooperators (after 2 · 105 update
steps) averaged over 50 realizations of the system, as a func-
tion of the game parameters T and S from Eq. 1. Colors
denote regions in the parameter space where final coopera-
tion exceeds the threshold value of 0.3. This is always the
case in the blue area, only if started with either cooperative
hubs or a metric cluster in the green region, only if started
with cooperative hubs in the yellow area, only if started with
metric clusters in the gray area, and for none of the consid-
ered initial conditions in the red region. A: Results for the
IPv6 Internet topology. B: Results for the arXiv collabora-
tion network. C: Synthetic network with N = 2 · 104 nodes,
power-law exponent γ = 2.4, mean degree 〈k〉 ≈ 6, and clus-
tering c¯ = 0.5. D: The same as before but for networks with
power-law exponent γ = 2.9 and clustering c¯ = 0.6.
i.e. we select nodes proportional to their degree; (iii)
we assign the same number of cooperators into a metric
cluster in the similarity space (see Methods). The first
strategy serves as a null model, the second mimics the
potential of the hubs to drive the system towards coop-
eration, while the last strategy serves as a proxy for the
ability of metric clusters of cooperators to survive.
Fig. 3A shows the result for the Internet IPv6 topol-
ogy, where we show the regions in the T − S plane, in
which the degree of final cooperation exceeds an arbitrar-
ily chosen threshold value of 0.3. In the blue area, this
is always the case. In the green region, this holds if the
system began with cooperative hubs or a metric cluster.
In the yellow region, the cooperative threshold is only
exceeded if the system began with cooperative hubs (see
Supplementary Materials for details). This behavior is
significantly different in the case of the arXiv collabora-
tion network (Fig. 3B). In contrast to the previous case,
there is no region where only initially cooperative hubs
allow for sustained cooperation. In the gray region, how-
ever, final cooperation only exceeds the threshold value if
the system was started with cooperators forming a met-
ric cluster. Hence, whereas in the Internet IPv6 topology
hubs can drive the system towards cooperation, in the
case of the arXiv network metric clusters are more effi-
cient at sustaining cooperation than the most connected
nodes. We observe a similar behavior using synthetic
scale-free networks with different mean local clustering
coefficients and power-law exponents. Fig. 3C shows a
similar behavior to that of the Internet (i.e. the hubs
are more efficient than metric clusters), whereby the net-
works were generated with a power-law exponent γ = 2.4
and mean local clustering coefficient c¯ = 0.5 (here, coop-
eration is sustained in none of the cases in the red re-
gion). In Fig. 3D we find a behavior similar to the arXiv
(i.e. metric clusters are more efficient than the hubs),
where we have generated synthetic networks with power-
law exponent γ = 2.9 and clustering c¯ = 0.6. To con-
clude, in very heterogeneous networks, hubs are efficient
at driving the system towards cooperation, whereas in
less heterogeneous—but including scale-free—networks,
metric clusters are more efficient.
To investigate this effect in detail, let us now con-
sider the prisoner’s dilemma game, in particular param-
eters S = −0.5 and T = 1.5 in the payoff matrix from
Eq. (1), which is widely used as a proxy for real social
dilemma situations. We vary the network topology us-
ing the model mentioned earlier. In particular, we tune
the heterogeneity in terms of the power-law exponent γ
and the mean local clustering coefficient, c¯, which is a
measure of the strength of the underlying metric struc-
ture [32]. We consider the different strategies of allocat-
ing the initial cooperators discussed before.
The combination of the initial conditions and the net-
work topology yields particularly interesting insights. If
the initial cooperators are distributed randomly, final
cooperation is always very low for the chosen parame-
ters T and S (Fig. 4A). We find the same result (see
Fig. S4 in the Supplementary Materials) if the initial co-
operators are assigned into a connected (i.e. unique net-
work [18]) cluster (see Methods). However, if the initial
cooperators are distributed among the hubs of the sys-
tem and the network is sufficiently heterogeneous, they
are able to drive the system to a highly cooperative state
(see blue region Fig. 4B, and Supplementary Video 2).
Large mean local clustering c¯, which implies a strong
metric structure, adds to this effect (cf. green region in
Fig. 4D and Fig. 4E), in agreement with [33]. Impor-
tantly, if the network is not sufficiently heterogeneous,
but still scale-free, the hubs lose their ability to control
the system and defection eventually prevails (red region
in Fig 4B, Supplementary Video 3). In contrast, if we
begin with the initial cooperators clustered in the met-
ric space, this will allow for sustained cooperation even
in scale-free networks, but only if the metric structure is
sufficiently strong (see Fig. 4C, blue region in Fig. 4D,
and Supplementary Video 4). If the network becomes
too heterogeneous, the clusters are no longer sustained
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Figure 4. A-C: Final (after 2 · 105 update steps) density of cooperators (color coded) for the prisoner’s dilemma game
(T = 1.5 and S = −0.5) averaged over 50 realizations as a function of the degree distribution power-law exponent γ and mean
local clustering c¯. Networks have N = 2 · 104 nodes and a mean degree 〈k〉 ≈ 6. The initial density of cooperators is always
c(0) = 0.5. A: Randomly assigned initial cooperators. B: Hubs are assigned as initial cooperators with a probability p ∝ k.
C: Initial cooperators are localized in the angular space. D: Regions where the final cooperation exceeds a threshold value
of 0.3 for the cases presented in (A-C). E: Final cooperation as a function of the network heterogeneity for different values of
c¯ starting with preferential hub assignment, representing different cuts through (B). Errorbars denote one standard deviation
from top to bottom. F: Final cooperation as a function of the network heterogeneity for different values of c¯ starting with
cooperators assigned into a metric cluster, representing different cuts through (C). G: Final cooperation density as a function
of the network size for synthetic networks with power-law exponent γ = 2.9, c¯ = 0.6, and mean degree 〈k〉 ≈ 6. H: Final
cooperation for different network sizes (see legend) and the same parameters as before. Initial cooperators (c(0) = 0.5) are
assigned into different numbers of disjoint metric clusters, whose number is plotted on the x-axis in the top panel. The bottom
panel shows on the x-axis the resulting absolute size of each cluster, given by the number of nodes divided by twice the number
of cooperating clusters.
(see Fig. 4F and Supplementary Video 5).
We also investigate whether network and cluster size
affect the ability of metric clusters of cooperators to sur-
vive. In Fig. 4G we show that the final cooperation den-
sity increases with the system size and saturates to a
value close to C = 0.5. For a fixed network size, coop-
eration decreases if we assign cooperators into a larger
number of smaller clusters (see Methods), as shown in
Fig. 4H (top). However, if plotted as a function of the
absolute size of the individual clusters (which can be cal-
culated by dividing the number of nodes by twice the
number of clusters), the curves that correspond to differ-
ent network sizes collapse, see Fig. 4H (bottom). This
suggests that the survival of a metric cluster of coopera-
tors is directly related to its absolute size.
Finally, we can formulate approximatively conditions
for the survival of cooperating metric clusters. Their sur-
vival is favored if they are large enough, i.e. their size
is nc > 10
3 (see Fig. 4G), if the mean local clustering is
high enough, i.e. c¯ > 0.5 (see Fig. 4F), and if the network
is not too heterogeneous, i.e. γ > 2.5.
D. Fraction of intercluster links explains the
survival of metric clusters
The survival of metric clusters of cooperators can be
understood as analogous to spatial selection in Euclidean
space in lattice topologies. In this case, clusters of coop-
erators survive because they are shielded from surround-
ing defectors, such that the interactions between cooper-
ators and defectors only occur at the border of the clus-
ters. Similarly, in heterogeneous networks, metric clus-
ters survive because they are shielded from surrounding
defectors and their spatial organization reduces the num-
ber of interactions between cooperating and defecting in-
dividuals. For larger clusters, the relative surface area of
the border in contact with adjacent defectors decreases,
which shields them more effectively and hence explains
why they are more likely to survive (see Fig. 5A). For a
given size, two different mechanisms determine the num-
ber of links between spatially clustered cooperators and
defectors. Firstly, the greater the degree of heterogene-
ity, the larger the number of hubs, i.e. high degree nodes.
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Figure 5. A: Fraction of links between nodes in a met-
ric cluster spanning half of the network to nodes outside of
the cluster compared to the total number of links in the net-
work as a function of the network size for synthetic networks
with power-law exponent γ = 2.9, c¯ = 0.6, and mean degree
〈k〉 ≈ 6. The shaded area denotes one standard deviation
from top to bottom. B: The same fraction of links (color
coded) for synthetic networks with N = 2 · 104 nodes and
〈k〉 ≈ 6 as a function of the power-law exponent γ and mean
local clustering c¯.
These nodes are connected to many other nodes, and
therefore form long-range connections in the metric rep-
resentation, which are likely to connect cooperators and
defectors. This is the reason why more heterogeneity hin-
ders the survival of metric clusters (Fig. 5B). For a fixed
level of heterogeneity, increasing the mean local cluster-
ing coefficient will reduce the temperature T¯ , which re-
duces the amount of long-range connections due to ran-
domness, cf. Fig. 1A and B. Therefore, a higher degree of
mean local clustering reduces the number of intercluster
links, which in turn favors the survival of metric clusters
as explained before (see Fig. 5B).
III. DISCUSSION
Structured populations play an important role in the
evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Real con-
tact networks are heterogeneous (often scale-free) and
exhibit a high mean local clustering coefficient. The lat-
ter implies the existence of an underlying geometry [21].
Specifically, real heterogeneous networks can be embed-
ded into hyperbolic space comprised of a popularity (ra-
dial) dimension and a similarity (angular) dimension.
We have shown that this underlying metric space plays
an important role in the evolution of cooperation in het-
erogeneous contact networks. Specifically, evolutionary
dynamics lead to the formation of clusters of cooperators
in the angular dimension of the underlying metric space,
akin to spatial selection in Euclidean space [13, 14]. This
behavior can be understood in terms of the fraction of in-
tercluster links that determines how well metric clusters
of cooperators are shielded from surrounding defectors.
Depending on the power-law exponent γ of the degree
distribution and the mean local clustering coefficient c¯
(which is proportional to the strength of the metric struc-
ture), metric clusters can be more efficient at sustain-
ing cooperation than the most connected nodes, which is
the case in the arXiv collaboration network. Only when
the network is very heterogeneous, such as in the case
of the Internet IPv6 topology, are hubs more effective
at promoting cooperation. We have shown that if coop-
erators are clustered in the metric space, heterogeneity
can hinder cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma. Fi-
nally, one could argue that such a configuration is more
realistic than random initial conditions, as for example
the nodes in the Internet network that correspond to
the same countries are naturally clustered in the metric
space (see [25]), and different countries adopt different
attitudes towards mitigating climate change [34].
Our findings reveal that heterogeneity does not always
favor cooperation in evolutionary games on structured
populations, but can even have the opposite effect, thus
complementing existing studies about the impact of het-
erogeneity of realistic contact networks. Furthermore,
our framework unifies the description of spatial effects
and the heterogeneity of contact networks. This frame-
work can be applied to different games and extended to
multiplex networks, opening promising new lines of re-
search.
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METHODS
Evolutionary game dynamics
In the evolutionary game dynamics considered here, in-
dividuals play strategic games with their contacts where,
for instance, they have two strategic choices: they can
either cooperate (C) or defect (D). The payoff of each
two-player game is then described by the payoff matrix
M =
C D
C 1 S
D T 0
. (1)
Parameters T and S define different games [6]. T < 1 and
S > 0 defines the “harmony” game, T < 1 and S < 0
corresponds to the “stag hunt” game, T > 1 and S < 0
yields the “prisoner’s dilemma”, and finally for T > 1
and S > 0 we obtain the “snowdrift” game.
One round of the game consists of each individual play-
ing one game with each of her neighbors in the net-
work of contacts. For each game, nodes collect pay-
offs given by Eq. 1, which depend on the strategies of
7the involved players. Here, we consider the evolution of
the system to be governed by imitation dynamics [35–37]
(Fig. 1C), reflecting that individuals tend to adopt the
strategy of more successful neighbors. After each round
of the game (synchronous updates) each node i chooses
one neighbor j at random and copies her strategy with
probability Pi←j , specified by the Fermi-Dirac distribu-
tion [15, 38, 39]
Pi←j =
1
1 + e−(pij−pii)/K
, (2)
motivated by maximum entropy principles in Glauber-
like dynamics [35, 40]. pii and pij measure the payoffs of
nodes i and j, while K denotes the irrationality of the
players, which we set to 0.5. After all nodes have updated
their strategy simultaneously, we reset all payoffs.
In this contribution, games are played only on the giant
connected component (GCC) of the network of contacts.
Complex networks embedded into underlying metric
spaces
Metric spaces underlying complex networks provide
a fundamental explanation of their observed topolo-
gies [23, 24]. In the class of models used here, each node
i is mapped into the hyperbolic disk where it is repre-
sented by the polar coordinates ri, θi. These coordinates
abstract the popularity and similarity of nodes [24]. The
radial coordinate ri is related to the expected degree of
node i and therefore abstracts its popularity. More pop-
ular nodes are located closer to the center of the disk
(lower radial coordinate). The angular distance between
nodes i and j, ∆θij = pi − |pi − |θi − θj ||, is an abstract
measure of their similarity. Lower distance implies higher
similarity. The hyperbolic distance [23],
xij = cosh
−1 (cosh ri cosh rj − sinh ri sinh rj cos ∆θij) ,
(3)
combines information about both popularity and similar-
ity of nodes i and j, such that the connection probability
for a given pair of nodes depends only on their hyperbolic
distance.
To generate networks based on hidden hyperbolic
space, we distribute nodes on the hyperbolic disk by as-
signing polar coordinates (ri, θi) to each node. In par-
ticular, we draw θi from the uniform distribution U[0,2pi)
and radial coordinates ri from the distribution
ρ(r) =
1
2
(γ − 1)e 12 (γ−1)(r−R) , (4)
where R denotes the disk radius given by [23]
R = 2 ln
[
2TN
k¯ sin T¯ pi
(
γ − 1
γ − 2
)2]
, (5)
where N denotes the number of nodes, γ is the power-
law exponent of the degree distribution, and T denotes
the temperature. Finally, we connect pairs of nodes i
and j with probability p(xij), which depends exclusively
on the hyperbolic distance xij between nodes i and j.
The connection probability is given by the Fermi-Dirac
distribution
p(xij) =
1
1 + e
1
2T¯
(xij−R) , (6)
where the aforementioned temperature T¯ controls the
strength of the metric structure and the level of mean
local clustering, c¯. This is illustrated in Figs. 1A and B.
Finally, given a real network, coordinates of the nodes
can be inferred using maximum likelihood estimation
techniques [41, 42]. This enables us to identify the set
of coordinates that maximize the probability that the
observed real-world network was generated using the de-
scribed model. The inferred hyperbolic maps have proven
to be very accurate in the case of scale-free, clustered net-
works [25, 43, 44].
Mean local clustering and relation to the spatial
structure
The local clustering coefficient of node i is defined
as [45]
ci =
Number of closed triangles i participates in
ki(ki − 1) , (7)
where ki denotes the degree of node i. The maximal
number of closed triangles a node with degree ki can
participate in is ki(ki − 1). The mean local clustering
coefficient of a given network is then the average of ci
over all nodes with k > 1 (nodes with k = 1 cannot
participate in any triangles).
In the framework introduced in the previous section, a
low temperature T¯ implies a high mean local clustering,
which is the consequence of the triangle inequality in the
underlying metric space (Fig. 1A). A high temperature,
however, induces more randomness in the form of long-
range connections (see Eq. (6)), which reduces the mean
local clustering coefficient (Fig. 1B). See [23] for further
details.
KS-statistic
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic [28], which
we denote as ρ¯, is defined as the maximum absolute
difference between the values of two cumulative distri-
bution. We are interested in measuring the difference
between the distribution of cooperators in the angular
space, c(θ), whose cumulative distribution is given by
C(θ) =
∫ θ
0
dθ′ c(θ′), and the uniform distribution. Then,
8the KS statistic is given by
ρC = max
θ∈{0,2pi}
∣∣∣∣C(θ)− θ2pi
∣∣∣∣ (8)
and analogously
ρD = max
θ∈{0,2pi}
∣∣∣∣D(θ)− θ2pi
∣∣∣∣ , (9)
where D(θ) = θ − C(θ) denotes the cumulative distribu-
tion of defectors in the angular space. Finally, we define
ρ¯ = cρC + (1− c)ρD , (10)
where c denotes the density of cooperators at the current
timestep. Note that here we omitted the time depen-
dency.
Assignment of initial cooperators
In this contribution, we always start with an initial
cooperation density of C(0) = 0.5. However, the distri-
bution of initial cooperators in the network can be differ-
ent. In particular, we distinguish between the following
procedures.
Random assignment: Each node is initialized as a
cooperator with 50% probability and as a defector oth-
erwise.
Hubs: We preferentially assign hubs as initial coop-
erators. To this end, we assign N/2 cooperators which
we select proportional to their degree, i.e. pc(k) ∝ k. N
denotes total number of nodes in the network.
Metric cluster: We sort all nodes by their angular
coordinate θ, and assign the first N/2 nodes as coopera-
tors.
Multiple metric clusters: We again sort all nodes
by their angular coordinate θ. We now fix a number of
distinct clusters, nc, and assign the first N/(2nc) nodes
as cooperators, the second N/(2nc) nodes as defectors,
the third N/(2nc) as cooperators and so on. See Supple-
mentary Materials for an explicit example.
Connected cluster: We assign N/2 nodes into a con-
nected cluster, or unique network cluster [18]. To this
end, we start from the initial graph and randomly re-
move nodes until the size of the giant connected compo-
nent (GCC) reaches N/2. The nodes that are now in the
GCC are assigned as cooperators in the original graph,
and the remaining N/2 nodes are assigned as defectors.
This procedure ensures that the initial cooperators form
a unique connected cluster. Note that a network cluster
in general is not the same as a metric cluster.
Empirical networks
The arXiv data is taken from [46] and contains co-
authorship networks from the free scientific repository
arXiv. The nodes are authors that are connected if they
have co-authored a paper. In arXiv, each paper is as-
signed to one or more relevant categories. The data only
covers papers containing the word “networks” in the ti-
tle or abstract from different categories up to May 2014.
Here, we consider the category “Molecular Networks” (q-
bio.MN). The network has approx. 1905 nodes, mean
degree 〈k〉 = 4.6, clustering coefficient c¯ = 0.66, and a
power-law degree exponent γ = 3.9.
The IPv6 Autonomous Systems (AS) Internet topology
was extracted from the data collected by the Archipelago
active measurement infrastructure (ARK) developed by
CAIDA [47]. The connections in each topology are not
physical but logical, representing AS relationships. An
AS is a part of the Internet infrastructure administrated
by a single company or organization. Pairs of ASs peer
to exchange traffic. These peering relationships in the
AS topology are represented as links between AS nodes.
CAIDA’s IPv6 [48] datasets provide regular snapshots of
AS links derived from ongoing traceroute-based IP-level
topology measurements. The considered topology was
constructed by merging the AS link snapshots during the
first 15 days of January 2015, which are provided at [49].
The network consists of N = 5162 nodes, has a power
law degree distribution with exponent γ = 2.1, average
node degree k¯ = 5.2, and average clustering c¯2 = 0.22.
The hyperbolic maps for both datasets have been taken
from [44].
Supplementary Fig. S2 shows the final density of coop-
erators for both networks and for the different allocation
strategies described in the main text.
Data and code availability
To facilitate the application of our framework for
future work, we enclose the empirical datasets and
their inferred hyperbolic maps as well as an imple-
mentation of the model networks used in this pa-
per (figshare.com/articles/DataAndModel zip/4817947).
An implementation of the technique to construct hyper-
bolic maps for real networks [41, 42] is publicly available
at [50].
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